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THE BRE-X STOCK DEBACLE: WHY THE
ENACTMENT OF CANADIAN FEDERAL
SECURITIES LEGISLATION WOULD BE
GOOD AS GOLD
I. INTRODUCTION
The whirlwind saga of the Bre-X corporation left countless
disappointed investors and numerous broken bank books in its
wake. In 1993, Bre-X Minerals Ltd. (Bre-X), a Calgary-based
gold exploration company, acquired the rights to develop
Busang and other Indonesian properties for $180,000.' During
the next four years, Bre-X perpetrated the biggest gold mining
fraud in history.2 Claiming in 1995 that it had stumbled upon
one of the world's largest gold finds in the rain forests and
rugged hills of Busang, in East Kalimantan, Indonesia, Bre-X
conservatively estimated the find to be between 30 and 70
million ounces of gold3 worth between 11.5 and 25.5 billion
dollars.4 Immediately following the announcement, stock in
Bre-X skyrocketed, with investors from around the world try-
ing to cash in on the company's rags to riches success story.
The stock, originally a penny stock listed on the Alberta and
Ontario Stock Markets, traded on the Toronto Stock Exchange
(TSE) and the NASDAQ and rose to more than 200 dollars per
share (Canadian) before splitting ten for one in May 1996.' At
its peak, Bre-X traded at over 280 dollars per share (Canadi-
an)' and its market value topped 6 billion dollars (Canadian).7
1. See Mark Heinzl, Bre-X Probe Intensifies as Tests Find Little Gold, WALL
ST. J., May 6, 1997, at A3.
2. See Peter Waldman & Jay Solomon, Gold Fraud Recipe? Bre-X Workers
Saw Mine Samples Mixed, WALL ST. J., May 6, 1997, at Al.
3. See A Bre-X Chronology, OTTAWA CITIZEN Mar. 27, 1997, at D1. John
Felderhof, Vice Chairman of Bre-X, at one point estimated the find to be 200
million ounces, worth 70 billion dollars. See Panning For Truth on the Slag Heap
of Tarnished Gold, JAKARTA POST, Sept. 13, 1998, available in LEXIS, Nexis Li-
brary, Worldnews File.
4. Dollar values are approximate and are based on the Comex spot price of
gold on the last day of Oct. 1995 and Feb. 1997, the months in which the esti-
mates were announced. See WALL ST. J., Nov. 1, 1995, at Cl; WALL ST. J., Mar.
3, 1997, at C1.
5. See Heinzl, supra note 1.
6. See Bertrand Marotte, Regulators To Look At Tougher Mining Rules: In-
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John Felderhof, Vice Chairman and chief geologist of Bre-X,
was awarded "Prospector of the Year" by the Prospectors and
Developers Association of Canada,' and Michael T. de
Guzman, the geologist credited with the "discovery,"9 was fly-
ing high over his achievement. Everything was "golden" for the
corporation.
Unfortunately, as the saying goes, all that glitters is not
gold, and the tale of the Bre-X corporation provides no excep-
tion to the rule. In February 1997, Freeport McMoRan Copper
& Gold Inc. (Freeport), a New Orleans-based mining corpora-
tion hand-picked by the Indonesian government to run the
Busang mine, began drilling at the Busang site in an attempt
to confirm Bre-X's findings."0 However, after two weeks,
Freeport found itself in an unenviable position as initial tests
failed to yield results comparable to those of Bre-X." Freeport
chairman Jim Bob Moffet telephoned Bre-X Chairman David
Walsh to inform him of the discrepancy and to request that
Bre-X officials return to Busang to sort out the problem.1
2
One week later, de Guzman boarded a helicopter at Samarinda
airport to meet with Freeport officials in Busang. s Unfortu-
nately, the meeting never took place. Seventeen minutes into
the journey, de Guzman leapt to his death somewhere over the
jungles of Borneo.'4
dustry Officials Welcome Efforts to Tighten Standards after Bre-X Fiasco, OTTAWA
CITIzEN, Apr. 12, 1997, at Fl.
7. See James McCarten, Procedural Wrangling Bogs Down Bre-X Hearing,
LONDON FREE PRESS, Oct. 20, 1998, at D2, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Worldnews File.
8. See Andrew Willis & Douglas Goold, Bre-X The One Man Scam, THE
GLOBE AND MAIL (July 22, 1997) <http'//www.bre-x.com/media/gm072297.htm>.
9. See Maria Bohuslawsky, 'Hero' Behind Massive Gold Discovery Falls to His
Death, OTTAWA CITIZEN ONLINE (Mar. 20, 1997) <http:J/www.ottawacitizen.com/
business970320/886188.html>.
10. See Jennifer Wells, The Bre-X Bust: Is the 'World's Greatest Gold Find' a
Fraud?, MACLEAN'S, Apr. 7, 1997, at 50.
11. See Bertrand Marotte, Bre-X Waited Two Weeks Before Releasing Bad
News, OTTAWA CITIZEN, May 7, 1997, at Al.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. See Wells, supra note 10. Controversy surrounded the death of de
Guzman. Bre-X officials stated that de Guzman had recently learned he had con-
tracted a serious illness. However, de Guzman's family denied the allegation that
he committed suicide because he was suffering from hepatitis B. See Anthony De
Palma, Bre-X From Rags to Riches, Back to Rags, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 1997, at
D1. Indonesian authorities denied the involvement of foul play and ruled de
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Freeport's public announcement that preliminary tests
indicated "insignificant amounts of gold" 5 at the Busang site
sent Bre-X spiraling into a tailspin from which it would never
recover. One day after the announcement, Bre-X stock fell
thirteen dollars per share (Canadian), wiping out nearly three
billion dollars (Canadian) in market capitalization." Trading
in Bre-X was so high that on April 1, 1997, the TSE computers
could not withstand the volume and crashed, shutting down
the entire exchange for nearly an hour. 7 Bre-X's woes were
not limited to a fall in share price, however. On April 8, 1997,
Bre-X headquarters were cleared due to a bomb threat" and
in May, hundreds of local workers in Indonesia, fearing they
would not be paid by the suffering corporation, held two Indo-
nesian Bre-X managers hostage for more than two days at the
Busang mine. 9
Hoping to prove Freeport's findings incorrect, Bre-X hired
an independent consultant, Strathcona Minerals Services, Ltd.
(Strathcona), to review the ominous situation.0 Strathcona
performed a technical audit of the work done by both Bre-X
and Freeport, and on May 3, released an initial report in which
it concluded:
1. Only trace amounts of gold have been found in the sam-
ples assayed, and there were no samples that gave gold
values of economic interest.
2. As a consequence, we believe there to be virtually no
possibility of an economic gold deposit in the Southeast
Zone I South of the Busang property ....
5. The gold recovered in the samples submitted by Bre-X
has originated from a source other than the Southeast
Guzman's death to be a suicide. See RCMP Say Bre-X Fraud Far From Being
Solved, OTTAWA CITIZEN, Aug. 14, 1997, at C3 [hereinafter Far From Being
Solved].
15. A Bre-X Chronology, supra note 3.
16. Se Marotte, supra note 6.
17. See Bre-X Shares Plummet After Fraud Exposed, L.A. TIMES, May 7, 1997,
at D3.
18. See A Bre-X Chronology, supra note 3.
19. See Bre-X Officials Being Held by Workers Demanding Pay, FIN. POST,
May 14, 1997, available in 1997 VWL 409465.
20. See Marotte, supra note 11.
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Zone of the Busang property and has resulted in falsifi-
cation and misrepresentation of many thousands of sam-
ples with consequent and subsequent erroneous esti-
mates of gold resources.2
Freeport's findings were accurate. There was no gold at the
Busang site. One week after the announcement, both the TSE
and the NASDAQ delisted Bre-X from the exchanges,22 bring-
ing the precipitous decline to a screeching halt.
While Bre-X officers escaped virtually unscathed financial-
ly,' unsuspecting investors were not so lucky. By the time
the nightmare had finally ended, investors, unable to sell their
shares in Bre-X, had lost millions on the bogus find.' The
fraud cost more than dollars and cents, however. In Vancouver,
a sixty-two-year-old attorney shot and killed himself after
losing 3 million dollars investing in Bre-X stock.' As
Felderhof sat in his posh resort home in the Cayman Is-
lands,26 the family of Lawrence Beadle sat in prayer, mourn-
ing their loss.
While an investigation into the disaster has begun, the
Royal Canadian Mounty Police declared in August 1997 that
the fraud was far from being solved. However, slowly but
surely the pieces of this complex puzzle are surfacing and
beginning to fit together. Canadian investigators in Indonesia
report that de Guzman perpetrated the fraud with about 60
ounces of gold bought from a local Borneo tribesman." With
those 60 ounces, de Guzman weaved an elaborate scheme that
even Rumplestiltsken would have been proud of. Investigators
21. Strathcona1 Minerals Services, Ltd., Busang Technical Audit-Interim Report
(May 3, 1997) <http'J/www.bre-x.comnmedia/prO50597letterI.html> [hereinafter Inter-
im Report].
22. Toronto Stock Exchange Delists Bre-, CHI. TRIB., May 8, 1997, available
in 1997 WL 3546650.
23. David Walsh (CEO), Jeanette Walsh (Secretary), and John Felderhof (Vice-
Chairman) all sold shares in Bre-X prior to the decline. Combined, the three
earned 77 million dollars selling shares of Bre-Y. See Marotte, supra note 6.
24. See Edward Wyatt, Small Investors and Big Money Taken by Tale of Jun-
gle Gold, N.Y. TIES, May 6, 1997, at Al.
25. See David Baines, Vancouver Man Killed Self Over Bre-X Decline, OTTAWA
CITIZEN, May 9, 1997, at F2.
26. See Joe Warmington, Nice Place to Hide, CALGARY SUN (May 11, 1997)
<http'J/www.canoe.ca/CalgaryBrexfmayll.2.htm>.
27. See Far From Being Solved, supra note 14.
28. See Willis & Goold, supra note 8.
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believe that "rock samples drilled and crushed at Busang...
were sent on a 30 hour barge ride to Bre-X's offices in
Samarinda on the coast of the island of Borneo."29 Once at the
office, the crushed rock was placed around a pool table where
de Guzman and others mixed the raw ore with a combination
of river gold and barren crushed rock from Busang.0 Investi-
gators sense that de Guzman had a series of buckets contain-
ing different concentrations of gold surrounding the pool table.
"If he wanted to produce a sample that would assay out to
three grams of gold for each tonne of rock, he would take A
scoop from one bucket. If his goal was four grams of gold per
tonne, he took it from another."31 Summing up the fiasco best,
Strathcona in its report stated,
the magnitude of the tampering with core samples that we
believe has occurred and resulting falsification of assay val-
ues at Busang, is of a scale and over a period of time and
with a precision that, to our knowledge, is without precedent
in the history of mining anywhere in the world.32
Public outcry following the disaster was tremendous. In-
vestors from around the world sought retribution for their
losses." "In the orgy of recriminations that inevitably follows
big scandal-and particularly one in which lots of people lose a
lot of money-we frequently succumb to an impulse to engage
in indiscriminate finger-pointing."' Much of this "finger-
pointing" has been directed at the TSE and its regulations.
However, in a speech delivered before the Corporate Securities
Congress, Rowland Fleming, President and CEO of the TSE,
assured investors that the exchange was not to blame. 5 Vig-
orously defending the TSE, Fleming declared that "no ex-
29. Id.
30. See id.
31. Id.
32. Interim Report, supra note 21.
33. Several complaints have been filed naming as defendants Bre-X Minerals,
Ltd., certain of its current officers and directors, and others. See Bre-X Minerals,
Ltd., CANADA NEWSWIRE (Apr. 16, 1997) <http'J/www.newswire.ca/releases/
April1997/16/c3460.html>; DePalma, supra note 14.
34. Jeffrey Maclntosh, Don't Point Fingers at Regulatory System for the Bre-X
Debacle, FIN. POST, May 8, 1997, at 15, available in 1997 WL 4094293.
35. See The TSE: 'A Reliable Market for the Benefit of the Public", CANADA
NEWSWIRE, May 6, 1997 [hereinafter Remarks].
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change in the world could have prevented the Bre-X scan-
dal .... No matter how tough the securities regulations or
laws are, perpetrators of deceit... will find a way to break the
rules."36 Fleming's comments may have merit. However, while
other world markets "have contributed a long line of
fraudsters 37... it seems like Canada produces more stock
market fraud than do other countries."38 One reason for this
phenomenon might be that unlike other major industrial na-
tions like Japan, Great Britain and Germany, Canada does not
have a national regulatory agency for securities. Instead, it
"leaves the task to the provinces, which pursue oversight with
varying degrees of enthusiasm."39 In his remarks, Fleming ac-
knowledged this weakness in Canada's securities law and sug-
gested that a change was needed.40 However, as of the date of
this writing, a national regulatory system has not been adopt-
ed by Canada.
If the Canadian securities markets are to effectively com-
pete for the world's capital, stronger legislation must be adopt-
ed. At the present time, "there aren't enough teeth behind the
Canadian... laws to scare companies into compliance,"4' and
"although... no empirical research directly demonstrates that
concerns about integrity affect market activity, both authorita-
tive commentators and common sense tell us that if investors
36. Id.
37. Examples of securities fraud taking place in America include "Crazy"
Eddie Antar and Barry Minkow. See Floyd Norris, For Exchanges North of Border,
A Fresh Fraud, N.Y. TaIES, May 5, 1997, at D1.
38. Id.
In the late 1980's, the Vancouver Stock Exchange . . . was dubbed 'the
scam capital of the world,' and just last December, investors in Timuktu
Gold Corp.-a high-flier on the equally speculative Alberta Stock Ex-
change--saw their shares plunge more than 90% after the company's
claimed gold strike in West Africa turned out to be a fraud.
William C. Symonds, Black Eye for a Blue Chip Exchange, BUS. WK., Apr. 21,
1997, at 106. For other examples of Canadian stock market frauds, see Norris,
supra note 37.
39. Norris, supra note 37.
40. Fleming stated:
If it wasn't clear before Bre-X, it certainly should be by now that if Ca-
nadian companies are going to compete for the world's capital, they have
to have a national regulatory framework that is totally as competitive
and efficient and that speaks for the quality as well as regulates Canadi-
an securities standards.
Remarks, supra note 35.
41. Symonds, supra note 38.
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do not anticipate fair treatment, they will avoid investing in
securities."' Put more simply, if investors believe that the
Canadian regulatory framework is incapable of protecting their
investments, they will take their money to a more secure mar-
ket.
In their 1997 paper entitled "Legal Detriments of External
Finance,"' professors Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-
Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W. Vishny showed that
"countries with poorer investor protection, measured by both
the character of legal rules and the quality of law enforcement,
have smaller and narrower capital markets."' To prove this
theory, the professors looked at the ratio of stock market capi-
talization held by minority shareholders to gross national prod-
uct.45 In other words, the authors looked to the percentage of
non-internal finance in the countries' securities markets.4"
Not surprisingly, Canada's ratio was significantly below the
average for English common law countries,4 7 which are con-
sidered to offer the most protection to investors.48 In fact,
Canada's ratio was even lower than that of some French civil
law countries,4 9 which are considered to offer the least protec-
tion to investors.0
It is not difficult to understand why the authors elected to
analyze internal finance in their study. The amount of internal
42. WMLLU L. CARY & MELVIN A. ROSENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
CORPORATIONS 839 (7th ed. 1995). See also ABA Committee on Federal Regulation
of Securities, Report of the Task Force on Regulation of Insider Trading-Part 1:
Regulation Under the Antifraud Provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
41 BUS. LAw. 223 (1985). See also Jeffrey M. Laderman et al., The Epidemic of
Insider Trading- The SEC is Fighting a Losing Battle to Halt Stock-Market Abus-
es, BUS. WK., Apr. 29, 1985, at 7 (stating that "[ilf the investor thinks he's not
getting a fair shake, he's not going to invest, and that is going to hurt capital
investment in the long run").
43. Rafael La Porta et al., Legal Detriments of External Finance, 52 J. FIN.
1131 (1997).
44. Id. at 1131.
45. See id. at 1134.
46. To measure this, the authors "roughly estimate[d] the average fraction of
equity held by insiders by looking at the country's 10 largest publicly traded
nonstate firms, finding the combined ownership stake of the three largest share-
holders in each of these firms, and averaging that stake over the ten firms." Id.
at 1133.
47. See id. at 1138.
48. Rafael, supra note 43, at 1132.
49. See id. at 1138.
50. See id. at 1132.
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finance reveals a great deal about the level of investors' confi-
dence in the protections offered by a country's securities laws.
It is well settled that one of investors' primary concerns in
investing is how to control management and ensure they get
their investment back.51 In their paper entitled "A Survey of
Corporate Governance," Professors Shleifer and Vishny explore
this agency problem, theorizing that in a well functioning secu-
rities system, investors should be able to rely on the law to
provide them with the power to control unruly agents. Unfortu-
nately, many countries' laws do not grant enough power to the
shareholders and, thus, they are left with a level of legal pro-
tection inadequate to control agents.52 In such countries,
where "legal protection of investors is less substantial, either
because laws are bad or because courts do not enforce these
laws,... firms ... have difficulty raising outside funds, and
finance most of their investment internally."53 That Canada
has such a high percentage of internal ownership compared to
other countries, reveals that the system offers inadequate
protection for its investors, and according to the authors, this
inadequate protection has resulted in a narrow capital mar-
ket.5
"The importance of the securities market has been empha-
sized.., by repeated statements of the vast amounts of invest-
ment capital required by Canadian industry... especially for
the development and exploitation of new sources of energy, for
transportation and for the financing of small business."s A
loss of investment capital will severely cripple Canadian corpo-
rations as well as the Canadian economy. Steps must be taken
to prevent this from happening.
This paper is designed to suggest that Canada adopt a
national regulatory body to enforce Canadian securities law.
Part H will detail the development of Canada's current system
of securities regulation, from the enactment of the first provin-
cial securities act to the adoption of the closed system model,
51. See Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Gover-
nance, 52 J. FIN. 737, 737 (1997).
52. See id. at 770.
53. Id.
54. See discussion supra Part I.
55. Phillip Anisman & Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Aspects of Federal Secu-
rities Legislation, in 3 PROPOSALS FOR A SECURITIES MARKET LAW IN CANADA (Ot-
tawa: Minister of Supply & Services Canada ed., 1979).
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Canada's current regulatory system. Attention will be paid to
similarities between Canada's laws and those of Canada's
neighbor to the south, the United States. Part II will then shift
gears, focusing on weaknesses in the Canadian system, from
problems administering the law to problems enforcing it. Next,
the paper will discuss attempts by the local and federal
branches of the Canadian government to overcome these weak-
nesses via cooperation and attempts at uniform legislation.
Part II will conclude by arguing that although the provincial
system in place today was appropriate in the past, given the
state of the world's economy, advances in technology, and the
securities markets in general, proper regulation requires feder-
al intervention. It will analyze changing judicial sentiment
which will make this enactment possible, and briefly look at a
draft statute, pointing out how such a statute could alleviate
many of the problems that plague Canada's securities markets.
Part III will mirror the structure of Part II, beginning by
detailing the development of Australia's current regulatory
framework, from the adoption of the English regulations to the
enactment of the Corporations Act, 1989, Australia's current
regulatory system. Parallels will be drawn between the weak-
nesses in Australia's former schemes and the woes Canada is
currently experiencing in its quest to create a satisfactory
regulatory scheme. Attention will be paid to the troubles Aus-
tralia faced in its attempt to enact a federal scheme and how it
overcame these obstacles. Part III will then briefly analyze the
Corporations Act, 1989, which mandates the creation of the
Australian Securities Commission, and sets forth the structure
of Australia's national regulatory scheme. Finally, Part III will
demonstrate the success the Corporations Act, 1989 has had in
the administrative, enforcement, and legislative areas of the
law, success which has eluded Canada's securities law.
The paper will continue by briefly summarizing the key
points in the previous two sections, concluding that the strik-
ing similarities in the development of these two countries'
systems make Australia's system a viable model for Canada to
consider when it finally enacts federal law. The reader is cau-
tioned, however, that the purpose of this paper is not to sug-
gest that the Australian system offers the only or even the best
possible solution for Canada.56 It is merely to offer one alter-
56. Clearly, the U.S. model offers another viable solution. Australia was sim-
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native Canada might consider in its quest for an answer to its
regulatory quagmire.
II. CANADA'S CURRENT SECURITIES SYSTEM
In order to understand the Canadian securities system and
its faults, an introduction to the governmental framework of
Canada and the development of the Canadian securities sys-
tem is required. Legislative jurisdiction is allocated among the
thirteen jurisdictions of Canada" according to the British
North America Act, 1867 (BNA Act)."8 Titled "Legislative Au-
thority of the Parliament of Canada," Section 91 of the BNA
Act sets forth those subjects which fall under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the federal government. Included are the regula-
tion of trade and commerce,"9 the criminal law,60 and "[1]aws
for the [p]eace, [oirder and [g]ood [glovernment of Canada, in
relation to all [mlatters not coming within the [c]lasses of
[slubjects... assigned exclusively to the [legislatures of the
[plrovinces."6' By contrast, Section 92 of the BNA Act sets
forth those areas which fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of
the provincial government. Included in this list are local works
and undertakings,62 property and civil rights in the prov-
ince,' and the incorporation of companies with provincial ob-
jects."
While the federal government has enacted legislation af-
fecting the securities market by employing its jurisdiction over
crime, only the provinces, exercising their control over legisla-
ply chosen for the parallels that can be drawn between the States' securities in-
dustries.
57. The thirteen jurisdictions are the federal government, the Northwest Terri-
tories, the Yukon Territory, and the ten provinces (from east to west), Newfound-
land, Prince Edward Island, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Quebec, Ontario, Mani-
toba, Saskatchewan, Alberta, and British Columbia. See Henry Joseph Knowles et
al., Securities Regulation in Canada, in 1 INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES REGULA-
TION--CANADA 1 (Robert C. Rosen ed., 1994).
58. British North America Act, 1867, R.S.C. (1867) (Can.); CANADIAN CONSTI-
TUTIONAL DOCUMENTS CONSOLIDATED 145 (Bernard W. Funston & Eugene Meehan
eds., 1994) [hereinafter BNA Act]. The BNA act was renamed the Constitution
Act, 1867 in section 53 of the Constitution Act, 1982. Id. at 43.
59. BNA Act § 91(2).
60. Id. § 91(27).
61. Id. § 91.
62. Id. § 92(10).
63. Id. § 92(13).
64. BNA Act § 92(11).
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tion in relation to property and civil rights in the provinces,"
have enacted statutes that can properly be termed securities
legislation. Led by Manitoba, the provinces initially enacted
statutes aimed at punishing perpetrators of fraud." Ontario
followed suit in 1928, enacting the Security Frauds Prevention
Act, which provided for investigations into securities frauds.'
Other provinces entered the field, enacting legislation similar
in form to the Ontario Act through the 1930's.'
Subsequent securities legislation was greatly influenced by
the American system, which emphasizes disclosure." In 1947,
Ontario enacted legislation similar to the United States Feder-
al Securities Act of 1933.7o This new law required the disclo-
sure of information in prospectuses distributed to the public.7v
Like the '33 Act, the Ontario legislation included a provision
that imposed strict liability upon anyone who authorized a
prospectus containing any material false statement.7' Like the
'33 Act, however, this legislation stopped short in that it only
dealt with disclosures relating to initial public offerings.73 De-
spite the fact that the United States corrected this shortcoming
in the '33 Act one year later,74 Canada would have to wait
twenty years before the provinces would enact legislation to
65. This right has been interpreted to include contracts, dealings with proper-
ty and the regulation of businesses, trades and professions. See Anisman & Hogg,
supra note 55, at 144.
66. "The Manitoba Sale of Shares Act of 1912 required that any company not
organized in Manitoba had to obtain a license to sell shares in Manitoba and
required that certain documents dealing with the financial status of the company
be filed before a license would be given." MARK R. GILLEN, SECURITIES REGULA-
TION IN CANADA 58 (1992).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 57.
70. S.O. 1947, c. 98.
71. See GILLEN, supra note 66, at 58-59.
72. Id. at 59. Section 11(a) of the '33 Act, entitled Civil Liabilities on Account
of False Registration Statement, creates a cause of action for any purchaser of a
security if the prospectus contains an untrue statement of material fact or omits a
material fact. The section makes every person who signed the registration state-
ment liable, as well as directors, underwriters, and experts who prepared the
statement. See 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77a to 77aa (West 1981); Escott v. BarChris Constr.
Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
73. See GILLEN, supra note 66, at 59.
74. The Federal Securities Act of 1934 focused on continuing disclosure re-
quirements in the secondary market of securities. See 15 U.S.C-.A §§ 78a to 7811
(West 1981) [hereinafter the '34 Act].
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rectify the deficiency.
The Kimber repor 75 marked the beginning of modern
securities regulation in Canada. Sparked by the Shell Oil take-
over of Canadian Oil,76 the Commission primarily concerned
itself with insider trading and takeover bids, but it also ad-
dressed the degree of disclosure appropriate in secondary mar-
kets." Like the United States Federal Securities Act of
1934,78 the report recommended requirements for the distri-
bution of periodic financial statements, mandatory proxy solici-
tation, and reporting of insider trading.79 Many of these rec-
ommendations were codified in the Ontario Securities Act of
1966, which was subsequently enacted in all of the Western
provinces.""
"By the time the western provinces had adopted the Uni-
form Act, Ontario had [once] again reassessed the status of
securities law... This reassessment ultimately led to the
enactment of the 'closed system' statute in 1978.""' Supple-
menting the prior legislation, the closed system is based on the
concept that certain insiders do not need the protection provid-
ed by the extensive disclosure required by the securities
laws.82 However, outside of this select group, trading must be
accompanied by the appropriate disclosure. Piggy-backing the
innovation of Ontario yet again, most of the provinces have
adopted the "closed system" model with subtle variations.'
Many weaknesses can be exposed in Canada's fragmentary
system. Given the case at hand, the most troublesome is the
fact that the provincial governments, under the current sys-
tem, lack the jurisdiction to enforce their legislation outside of
75. The Kimber Report, more formally the "Report of the Attorney General's
Committee on Securities Legislation in Ontario," was named after then chairman
of the Ontario Securities Conmnission. See DAVID L. JOHNSTON, CANADIAN SECURI-
TIES REGULATION 15 (1977).
76. Controversy arose because insiders used their knowledge of the takeover
and bought shares of Canadian Oil prior to the announcement of the takeover,
thus reaping the benefit of a lower share price. See GILLEN, supra note 66, at 59.
77. See id. at 60.
78. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78a to 7811.
79. See GILLEN, supra note 66, at 60. For the corresponding requirements in
the '34 Act, see 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 13, 14, 16, 23.
80. Gilen, supra note 66, at 60.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
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the province.' Thus, even if a violation such as fraud or in-
sider trading is detected, prosecution is nearly impossible. As
John Woods, a former stock exchange floor trader who now
edits the investor newsletter Canada Stockwatch has said, "lax
regulators [have] made... Canada the ideal place to pull off
'the perfect crime." You're never, ever caught. Even if you are,
you're never convicted. It is virtually impossible to prove."S5
For proof of this chilling reality, one need only look at the
Bennett affair."5 In 1988, Doman Industries Limited (DIL), a
British Columbia company, entered negotiations with Louisi-
ana-Pacific Corporation (LP) whereby LP would acquire all or
a controlling interest in DIL. After a public announcement,
stock in DIL rose considerably. Russell Bennett and his broth-
er, William, former Prime Minister of B.C., had been acquiring
shares in DIL for nearly a year and had, by the time of the
announcement, acquired over 500,000 shares in the Canadian
corporation.88 Russell Bennett and Herb Doman, president of
DIL, were acquaintances, and when the deal between the two
corporations fell through, a timely call was placed from DIL's
offices to Bennett's.89 While news of the failed takeover
caused the price of DIL to fall, the Bennetts were able to sell
their shares in DIL prior to the announcement, enabling them
to capitalize on the higher market price of DIL. The
Bennetts' trading clearly constituted insider trading. However,
Ontario was unable to convict the brothers because, due to the
Bennett's residency (British Columbia), it could not enforce its
subpoena to compel the Bennetts to testify as to what was said
during the telephone conversations, and thus could not prove
the claim." It will be interesting how the Bre-X saga plays
84. See Philip Anisman, The Regulation of the Securities Market and the
Harmonization of Provincial Laws, in HARMONIZATION OF BUSINESS LAW IN CANA-
DA 79, 81 (Ronald C.C. Cuming ed., 1986).
85. Dana Flavelle, The Bre-X Wake-up Call, TORONTO STAR, Oct. 12, 1997, at
D1, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Worldnews File.
86. For an in depth look at the Bennett Case, see Cally Jordan, Lessons From
the Bennett Affair, 38 MCGILL L.J. 1071 (1993).
87. Id. at 1074.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Jordan, supra note 86, at 1077. The Ontario High Court refused to assist
in this matter stating that since the law was "silent outside of Ontario," there was
no statutory basis upon which the subpoena could be enforced. Id. at 1078.
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out, considering Bre-X was incorporated in Alberta and traded
in Ontario.
The provinces' inability to act beyond their territorial
boundaries renders them incapable of properly regulating the
securities markets. Realizing that the probability of conviction
for securities violations is slim, "[plerpetrators of fraud...
have exploited the potential for evasion of securities law by
organizing fraudulent schemes on an [interprovincial] basis."92
Barring constitutional amendment or federal participation in
the field, this situation will continue indefinitely. Faced with
this reality, investors are forced to either invest in the Canadi-
an markets, where there is no guarantee that their investment
is safe, or take their money to more secure markets where
regulations are properly enforced. Given the facility with which
an investor can invest in foreign markets, logic dictates, and
the'article by Shleifer and Vishny illustrates,93 that fewer and
fewer investors will choose the former. 4
"Regulation exists not only in the interests of investors but
also in the interests of enterprises which need to raise capi-
tal." 5 As a result, Canada's securities framework affects more
than just investors. Through legislation that differs in form
and substance, the provinces place an enormous burden upon
companies that must meet the numerous legislative require-
ments in the various jurisdictions. A company trying to con-
form to the laws of ten provincial jurisdictions will incur heavy
costs because of the difficulty in meeting the different require-
ments. Furthermore, "ilssuers of securities must pay a sum to
clear and distribute prospectuses, insider trading reports and
other documents across the country-not to mention 12 sets of
filing fees to the commissions themselves."96 Rather than
92. Anisman & Hogg, supra note 55, at 141.
93. See supra Part I.
94. Losing these investors will hurt more than the Canadian markets. Corpo-
rations, which rely heavily on the capital raised through the selling of securities
on the Canadian exchanges, will no longer be able to easily raise investment capi-
tal. As a result, many will be forced to forgo investment projects such as the
building of new factories. These factories could have provided a source of more
jobs and would have had other beneficial effects upon the Canadian economy.
Thus, the provinces' lack of enforcement power hurts the Canadian economy as a
whole.
95. ROBERT BAXT, SECURITIES INDUSTRY LAW 2 (4th ed., 1993).
96. Bertrand Simon, Canada Divided Over a Single Watchdog, FIN. TIMES,
May 26, 1996, at 23.
836 [Vol. XKIV:3
19991 CANADIAN SECURITIES REGULATION 837
fighting this legislative hodge-podge in which "the laws of one
province impose greater burdens than those of others, [corpora-
tions] engaging in the regulated activity may... avoid [the
laws] by conducting their business elsewhere or by excluding
residents of [a particular] province from participation in a par-
ticular transaction."97
While the provinces have attempted to overcome these
weaknesses through cooperation and attempts at uniform legis-
lation, their efforts have proven ineffective. Canadian Securi-
ties Administrators have met since the 1950's, producing joint
policy statements, studying potential new policy developments,
and conducting joint hearings "to avoid inconsistent require-
ments which would create impediments to the efficient func-
tioning of the securities market and thus undermine... the
purpose of the legislation.""8 Still,
securities regulation in Canada remains less than harmoni-
ous .... [Diespite continuous efforts by the Canadian Secu-
rities Administration to achieve a uniform or compatible
national system of regulation,... the provincial laws and
administrative policies differ in substance and in detail and
there is no prospect of a diminution in regulatory diversity or
its consequences.99
This problem stems in part from the dynamic nature of the
securities markets. In order to adapt to the constant changes
in information and technology, provincial legislators must
continually amend their securities law. This has been the case
throughout the history of Canadian securities regulation.'0
In the interest of keeping legislation uniform throughout the
provinces, the remaining provinces are then forced to amend
their law as well. However, by the time these provinces amend
their laws, amendments are being made to the amendments.
Further, "given the existence of ten different administrations
and ten different governments, there are bound to be honest
differences of opinion, political differences, inequalities in the
resources available, [and] in the standards of administra-
97. Anisman, supra note 84, at 81.
98. See GILLEN, supra note 66, at 61.
99. Anisman, supra note 84, at 127.
100. Id.
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tion .... The result is a permanent state of unevenness."'0 '
Thus, it seems that even with cooperation, problems will con-
tinue to plague the system.
Federal participation in the securities market is long over-
due. The securities system in Canada has undergone wide-
spread development over the years and no longer belongs with-
in the exclusive jurisdiction of the provinces. "The Confedera-
tion of 1867 was a hurried, rickety, political unification [and
there] was little travel or trade between... the central prov-
inces." 2 Thus, the framers did not foresee the development
of the securities market. However, while the framers did not
consider this future development,
[there is little doubt that the Fathers of Confederation envis-
aged vesting in the federal government primary responsibili-
ty for directing the national economy... as well as other
facets of government deemed by them to be of national impor-
tance. To the provinces they reserved their pre-Confederation
roles of regulating private law questions affecting property
and civil rights 'in the Province' and matters 'of a merely
local or Private Nature."' 3
Unfortunately, through the years, the judicial system has giv-
en validity to provincial acts, thus making federal participation
in the securities area less likely to occur. In the landmark case
of Lymburn v. Mayland,"' the Privy Council..upheld the
Alberta Security Frauds Prevention Act, 1930, as a valid exer-
cise of provincial jurisdiction. 6 "[T]he case, now the leading
decision in the field, has been broadly read so that in most
instances in which a question concerning the validity of a secu-
rities act has arisen, the provincial legislation has been up-
101. Id. at 129.
102. Edward J. Waltzer & Anton Sahazizian, Coordinate Securities Regulation:
Getting to a More Effective Regime, in SECURITIES REGULATION: ISSUES AND PER-
SPECTIVES 101, 104 (Carswell ed., 1994).
103. Jacob S. Ziegel, Harmonization of Provincial Laws, With Particular Refer-
ence to the Commercial, Consumer and Corporate Law, in HARMONIZATION OF BUSI-
NESS LAW IN CANADA 1, 1 (Ronald C.C. Cuming ed., 1986).
104. [19321 2 D.L.R. 6.
105. "At Confederation, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council was the
final court of appeal from all colonial courts." PETER W. HOGO, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW OF CANADA 202 (3d ed., 1992).
106. See Anisman & Hogg, supra note 55, at 144.
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held.""0 7 Courts have even upheld provincial legislation in
cases where trading was interprovincial and where there was
similar federal legislation. 8 "The reluctance of the courts to
strike down the provincial securities legislation likely stems in
part from the fact that there is no federal securities law so
that a declaration of the invalidity of a provincial act or any of
its provisions would create a potential gap in the existing regu-
latory scheme."0 9
If the Canadian government is to enact federal securities
law by exercising their power over trade and commerce, the
legislation will have to be able to withstand Constitutional
scrutiny. Undoubtedly, the provinces, unwilling to relinquish
control over a large revenue source, will challenge the legisla-
tion in court as an invalid intrusion upon their Constitutional-
ly granted power over property and civil rights. Clearly, an
overlap exists between the property and civil rights power and
the trade and commerce power. "Indeed, it might be said that
every trade and commerce power can also be construed as
falling within property and civil rights.""' However, as Sir
Montague Smith stated in Citizens Insurance Co. v. Par-
sons,"' it "could not have been the intention of [the framers
of the Constitution] that a conflict exist; and in order to pre-
vent such a result, the two sections must be read together, and
the language of one interpreted, and, where necessary, modi-
fied by that of the other.""2
Over the years, the courts have wrestled with Constitu-
tional challenges relating to the concurrent, yet conflicting,
power over trade and commerce and property and civil rights.
In General Motors of Canada v. City National Leasing,"'
Chief Justice Dickson, hoping to simplify the matter, offered a
three step analysis to determine whether a challenged provi-
sion of federal legislation may be upheld as a valid exercise of
the federal government's power over trade and commerce. The
second step of this analysis focuses on the validity of the feder-
107. Id.
108. See Don Tse, Establishing a Federal Securities Commission, 58 SASK. L.
REV. 427, 435 (1994).
109. Anisman & Hogg, supra note 55, at 145.
110. Tse, supra note 108, at 436.
111. [18811 7 A.C. 96.
112. Id. at 109.
113. [1993] 58 D.L.R. 4th 255.
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al act."4
To determine the validity of a federal act, courts must
ascertain whether the legislation meets the criteria set forth in
MacDonald v. Vapour Canada, Ltd."5 and Attorney General
of Canada v. Canadian National Transportation."' In
Vapour Canada, Chief Justice Laskin proposed three hall-
marks of validity to determine whether legislation subjected to
constitutional scrutiny is a valid exercise of the federal
government's power over trade and commerce. First, the courts
must determine whether the law contains a general regulatory
scheme. "Second, the scheme must be monitored by the contin-
uing oversight of a regulatory agency. Third, the legislation
must be concerned with trade as a whole rather than with a
particular industry.""' Seven years later, in Canadian Na-
tional Transportation, Chief Justice Dickson added two further
criteria:"'
First, the legislation should be of a nature that the provinces
jointly or severally would be constitutionally incapable of
enacting. Second, [the legislation must be the type where] the
failure to include one or 'more provinces or localities in a
legislative scheme would jeopardize the successful operation
of the scheme in other parts of the country."'
Application of the courts' criteria reveals that the enact-
ment of securities law is a valid exercise of the federal
government's power. While conjecture over the form and con-
tent of a federal act is mere speculation at this point, it is safe
to say that the legislation will take the shape of a regulatory
114. The other branches of the analysis ask whether the challenged provision
can be viewed as intruding on provincial powers and whether the challenged pro-
vision is sufficiently integrated into the federal scheme. Id. at 271. However, for
purposes of this paper, it is impractical to discuss the other two steps of Chief
Justice Dickson's analysis because a federal securities act is only a theory at this
point and there is no way of knowing what form the legislation will take or what
provision of the legislation the provinces will challenge.
115. [19761 66 D.L.R. 3d 1 (S.C.C.).
116. [1983] 76 C.P.R. 2d 1, 3 D.L.R. 4th 16.
117. General Motors, 58 D.L.R. 4th at 268.
118. Chief Justice Dickson indicated that, while these criteria may be used by
the Courts, they do not constitute an "exhaustive list, nor is the presence of any
or all of these indicia necessarily decisive. The proper approach . . . is still . . . a
case by case analysis." Id. at 269.
119. Id.
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scheme subject to the oversight of a federal body and "[w]hile
at first glance there may be contention over the third require-
ment, a closer examination reveals otherwise." As Don Tse
points out, federal securities legislation "is not legislation
aimed at the industry of trading in securities, [rather] it is
aimed at commerce in general, and financing through the issu-
ance of securities, specifically.""2 Further, while the provinc-
es will undoubtedly argue that they have effectively legislated
in the field of securities law since the beginning of the century,
and therefore, that any federal interference in the field is com-
pletely unwarranted, quite the contrary is true. As this paper
has demonstrated, developments in the securities industry
have rendered the provinces incapable of effectively legislating
in the field. Finally, omitting any province from the benefits of
this legislation defeats the very purpose for which the legis-
lation is to be enacted. The purpose of the legislation is to
facilitate the raising of capital throughout all of Canada. If the
legislation does not apply to one of the provinces, fraudsters
will simply carry out their wrongdoing in that province, beyond
the reach of the legislation's authority and the legislation will
have accomplished nothing more than to perpetuate the status
quo. Thus, by satisfying the five criteria set forth by the courts,
it seems as though federal securities legislation would survive
constitutional scrutiny.
Over the past three decades, many economists and legal
scholars have recommended the implementation of a federal
securities body, yet none of the proposals have come to fru-
ition. Alternatives range from "the addition of a thirteenth
administrator to replacement of all of the provincial agencies
by a single federal one."'22 To date, the most significant pro-
posal was made in 1979 by the Corporate Research Branch of
120. Tse, supra note 108, at 437.
121. Id.
122. Anisman, supra note 84, at 130. Other suggestions have been the creation
of a joint national commission to administer the provincial laws, or both federal
and provincial laws. For another novel solution to the problem, see Jean Martel,
Comments on 'Coordinated Securities Regulation: Getting to a More Effective Re-
gime", in SECURITIES REGULATION: ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES (Carswell ed., 1994)
(describing the 1994 proposal of the Honorable Marcel Mass6. The proposal endors-
es the adoption of federal legislation governing intra-provincial securities opera-
tions of participating provinces and inter-provincial securities operations among all
the provinces, regardless of participation in the scheme).
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the Department of Consumer and Corporate Affairs."
Written in the form of a draft statute entitled "The Cana-
da Securities Market Act" (CSMA), the proposal recognized the
national character of the securities industry as well as the
need for federal regulation in the field to ensure the continued
success not only of the securities industry, but also the well-
being of the Canadian economy. Section 1.02 of the CSMA
illustrates this understanding:
It is hereby declared that
(a) the efficient functioning of the capital market will facili-
tate the exploitation of natural resources in Canada, the
development of Canadian industry and, generally, the eco-
nomic well-being of Canada; ...
(f) national enforcement mechanisms are necessary to detect,
prevent and remedy fraudulent conduct, especially in light of
the interprovincial and international character of modern
securities markets and of fraudulent securities schemes
which necessitate cooperation between Canadian law en-
forcement agencies and those of other nations;
(g) the confidence of investors in the honest, fair and efficient
operation of the Canadian securities market and in the effec-
tiveness of its regulation is essential to the attainment of a
broadly based source of capital for Canadian industry and to
the efficiency of the securities market generally; [all of which
can best be accomplished by an independent public body to
regulate the Canadian securities market.., over which the
Parliament of Canada has legislative jurisdiction .... ."
To achieve these aims, Section 15.01 established a federal
body, the Canadian Securities Commission (the Commission),
to administer and enforce provisions of the Act.1" The Com-
mission was to be given broad investigatory powers as well as
the power to enforce penalties detailed in the CSMA. These
123. See generally 1 MINISTER OF SUPPLY AND SERVICES CANADA, CONSUMER
AND CORPORATE AFFAIRS CANADA, PROPOSALS FOR A SECURITIES MARKET LAW FOR
CANADA (1979).
124. The Canadian Securities Market Act § 1.02 (1979) [hereinafter CSMA].
125. See id. § 15.01.
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penalties included fines and imprisonment for violations of
provisions of the CSMA."6
The most significant factor of the CSMA, however, was
simply that it was federal law. Section 16.15 states that the
act "is binding on Her Majesty in right of Canada or a province
and any agent thereof."' Thus, for the first time in Canada's
history, securities law would be truly uniform throughout the
provinces. Corporations would no longer have to comply with
multiple sets of regulations nor would they be forced to pay
multiple sets of registration and filing fees. Further, because
federal law has the power to stretch across the provincial bor-
ders, the word "enforcement" would finally have meaning when
used in the securities law context. Travesties of justice such as
the Bennett affair could finally become a thing of the past, and
investors' confidence in the Canadian securities markets could
finally be restored. While the proposed statute "has since
served as the basis for revisions of numerous provincial stat-
utes and in the future may form the foundation of a federal
law,"' 5 the federal government indicated in 1982 that it did
not intend to implement the proposal.129 As a result, the pro-
vincial system of regulation remains in effect today, and the
problems that plague Canadian securities law remain a blem-
ish on the securities markets.
III. AusTRALiA's SECURITIES SYSTEM
The development of the present Australian securities sys-
tem closely mirrors that of the Canadian regime. While compa-
nies existed in Australia in the early 1800's,13O "[a]part from
126. For example, § 14.10 provides that
a person who:
(a) knowingly or recklessly makes a misrepresentation in violation of a
provision of this Act, a regulation under it or a by-law, . . . is guilty of
an indictable offense and is liable to a fine of $25,000 or to imprison-
ment for ten years or to both.
Id. § 14.10.
127. Id. § 16.15.
128. Stikeman, Elliot, Canada, in INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES LAW 31, 32
(1996).
129. See Waitzer & Sahazizian, supra note 102, at 106.
130. "[Ihe few business organizations operating in the infant colony of New
South Wales followed the contemporary English mixture of deed of settlement
companies, chartered companies, companies incorporated by private statute and
quasi-corporations. The first native company was the Bank of New South Wales,
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some minor legislation enabling joint stock companies to sue
and be sued.., there was no significant Australian [corporate]
legislation until [the] English Act of 1862 was adopted by each
colony." 3' The colonies enacted various English reforms to
the 1862 Act and experimented with different amendments of
their own.1.32 However, by the late 1950's, corporations, frus-
trated with the problems of doing business within six different
legislative regimes and recognizing the existence of the nation-
al character of the Australian economy, pushed for the adop-
tion of federal uniform companies legislation. However, a re-
strictive reading of Section 51(xx) of the Commonwealth Con-
stitution 3 3 by the High Court of Australia by its decision in
Huddert, Parker & Co. v. Moorehead"34 rendered the Com-
monwealth Parliament unable to enact national legislation in
the corporate field. 13  As a result, "[iun 1959, a committee of
State and Commonwealth Attorneys-General was created to
draft companies legislation to be uniform throughout Australia.
[Tihe committee... relied heavily on the Companies Act 1958
[and] adopted provisions from a wide range of other sourc-
formed by residents of the colony in 1817 as a partnership." Paul Redmond, A
Short History of Securities Regulation in Australia, in SECURIIES REGULATION IN
AUSTRALiA AND NEw ZEALAND 90, 90 (1994).
131. Id. at 91.
132. Victoria led the way creating a no-liability company in 1871, called the
Mining Companies Act 1871 (Vic.), which was developed to defeat fraudulent prac-
tices and implement reforms proposed by the Davey Committee on company ac-
counts and audit. Id. at n.11. In 1957, Victoria enacted the Companies Act 1958,
and became the first Australian state to adopt the Cohen Committee reforms. Id.
at 92 (stating that "[tihese reforms were among the sources drawn upon in pre-
paring the first ... Australian statute on companies, the so-called Uniform Com-
panies Acts of 1961-1962.").
133. Section 51(xx) of the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act grants
Parliament "the power to make laws for the peace, order, and good government of
the Commonwealth with respect to [floreign corporations, and trading or financial
corporations formed within the limits of the Commonwealth." The Commonwealth
of Australia Constitution Act, 1900, 63 & 64 Vict., ch. 12, § 51(xx) (Austl.); COLIN
HOWARD, AUSTRALIAN FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL LAw liii (3d ed. 1985); P.H. LANE,
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE AUSTRALiAN CONSTITUTIONS 268 (6th ed. 1994).
134. 44 C.L.R. 492.
135. While § 51(xx) seems to grant Parliament broad regulatory power over a
wide array of commercial entities, Chief Justice Griffith declared that the Consti-
tution did not confer the power to regulate the trading activities of corporations.
In reaching this conclusion, Chief Justice Griffith relied heavily on "the context of
the Constitution, and in particular the reservation to the States of the power to
enact domestic trade and commerce [legislation] was critical." PETER J. HANKS,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN AUSTRALIA 290 (1996).
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es"3 ' ultimately creating the first Uniform Companies Act
which was subsequently enacted by all of the States and terri-
tories of Australia.137 As was the case in Canada, however,
the uniform legislation was never really uniform.' Each
State adopted the legislation with its own modifications, thus
creating a system which contained a number of "substantive
and technical differences between the States"3 9 and left the
problem virtually unchanged. The variations became more
widespread after the "collapse of the debenture boom"40
which revealed weaknesses in the regulation of corporate bor-
rowing and prompted the States to amend their companies
legislation yet again, thus leaving "the fabric of uniformity...
torn.
" 141
The push for a securities and exchange commission arose
after events transpired which were eerily similar to those of
Bre-X. On October 1, 1969, a small mineral explorer, Poseidon
NL, 42 announced the discovery of substantial amounts of
nickel and copper at its Windarra mine in Western Austra-
lia.' The company's stock price soared, reaching a value of
over $200 per share by the end of the year and prompting
speculative activity in other mining exploration companies.'
News of Poseidon attracted the attention of Parliament, and
amidst complaints of insider trading and a failure of the local
exchanges to properly investigate the matter, the Senate re-
solved,
that a Select Committee be appointed to inquire into and
report upon the desirability and the feasibility of establishing
a securities and exchange commission by the Commonwealth
either alone or in co-operation with the States and the pow-
ers and functions necessary for such a commission to enable
136. Redmond, supra note 130, at 92.
137. Id.
138. See supra Part I.
139. Redmond, supra note 130, at 92.
140. Id. at 92-93. A debenture is "a promissory note or bond backed by the
general credit and earning history of a corporation and usually not secured by a
mortgage or lien on any specific property; e.g., an unsecured bond. Holders of
corporate debentures are creditors of the corporation and entitled to payment be-
fore shareholders upon dissolution." BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY 401 (6th ed., 1990).
141. Redmond, supra note 130, at 93.
142. NL stands for no liability.
143. See Redmond, supra note 130, at 93.
144. Id.
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it to act speedily and efficiently against [such] improper or
injurious practices as the committee finds have occurred or
may occur in relation to shares and other securities of public
companies, and to recommend [such] measures... as winl...
enable the utmost protection of members of the public and
the national interest.'
The committee report, released in 1974, detailed findings of
numerous unfair practices and criticized the various State and
Territorial legislators for their inadequate performance in
regulating the securities markets. 46 Asserting that securities
markets had become national in scope, the committee recom-
mended the adoption of a national securities regulator.47 The
committee received assistance in' 1971 from the High Court'
when it overruled its previous holding in Huddart49 and
seemingly made federal legislation a possibility. Attempting to
seize the moment, the Australian government prepared a draft
bill containing national legislation, but the party was voted out
of power the day before the bill was to be introduced to the
House of Representatives. 5 '
The cooperative scheme adopted by Australia in lieu of the
national regime did not fare any better than previous legisla-
tion. Balking at the idea of a national securities regulator, the
new government continued to pursue uniform companies legis-
145. Id. at 94.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. See Strickland v. Rocla Concrete Pipes Ltd. (1971) 124 C.L.R. 468.
149. See Redmond, supra note 130, at 95. The High Court declared that in
Huddart Parker it had placed too much reliance on the doctrine of reserved pow-
ers, a doctrine which contradicted the Constitution, and thus, the reasoning and
decision were faulty. Chief Justice Barwick explained:
Section 107 of the Constitution ... leaves [the States the] residue of
power after full effect is given to the powers granted to the Common-
wealth. [Thus [Huddart Parker] virtually reversed the Constitution. The
question in relation to the validity of a Commonwealth Act is whether it
fairly falls within the scope of the subject matter granted to the Com-
monwealth by the Constitution.
While the High Court held that the challenged regulations in the Strickland case
did fall within the ambit of § 51(xx), it refused to define the limits of the Consti-
tutional provision declaring instead that the law must develop on a case by case
basis. See Strickland, 124 C.L.R at 489.
150. The bill was introduced to the House as a private members bill the fol-
lowing year, but was defeated. See Redmond, supra note 130, at 95 (stating that
the bill lapsed upon the dismissal of the Whitlam Government).
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lation as a viable solution.'5' The new scheme consisted of a
three-tiered regulatory hierarchy. At the top was the Ministeri-
al Council, a body comprised of the Attorneys-General of each
of local governments as well as the Commonwealth-Gener-
al.'52 Directly below was a newly created body, the National
Companies and Securities Commission (NCSC), designed as
the central administrator of the regime.153 Finally, each State
maintained a Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC) to perform
the bulk of administrative duties under the scheme."5 While
the new regime was successful in establishing uniform compa-
nies regulation throughout Australia, it, too, was plagued by
problems and found itself unable to adequately fill the void in
Australia's company and securities legislation.'55
Growing dissatisfaction with the ineffectiveness of the
NCSC to properly enforce corporate law led to an inquiry by
the Senate Standing Committee on Constitutional and Legal
Affairs.'56 In a report released May 1987, the Committee con-
cluded that "the cooperative system had outlived its useful-
ness"57 and that comprehensive national legislation regulat-
ing corporations and securities should be enacted to fill the
gap. The result of this recommendation was the drafting of the
151. Id. at 96-97.
152. Id. at 97.
153. Id.
154. Id. See also Colleen Ryan, Bringing Law and Order to the Corporate Fron-
tier, INsTIrUTIoNAL INVESTOR, Aug. 1989, at 90 (indicating that the state CACs
derived their powers as delegates of the NCSC which was, in turn, responsible to
the Ministerial Council, composed of the attorneys general of the six states and
the national government).
155. "Under the 1978 agreement, the Commonwealth was bound to enact
amending legislation agreed upon at a [meeting of the] Ministerial Council by a
simple majority. Each participant had one vote on new legislation and the Com-
monwealth could find itself having to arrange the passage of legislation of which
it did not approve." BAXT, supra note 95, at 4. Further, despite being above the
CACs in the hierarchical system, the NCSC could not force States to investigate
alleged wrongdoings. In addition, the NCSC found itself tremendously understaffed
and underfunded, thus making it unable to deliver on its promise "to deliver
tough penalties to stockmarket sharks." Brucing Up the Shark Patrol, ECONOMIST,
June 11, 1988, at 78. Finally, it was said that "the scheme's division of responsi-
bility between the State and Federal regulators [made] them ineffective to enforce
corporate law adequately. That in turn was said to cause [investors] to question
the integrity of the Australian markets." BAXT, supra note 95, at 4.
156. See Ryan, supra note 154.
157. Id.
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Corporations Act 1989 (the 1989 Act),'58 which entered into
force on January 1, 1991.'
The 1989 Act created a truly national legislative scheme,
and thus succeeded where its predecessors had failed. Accord-
ing to the 1989 Act, a corporate body, the Australian Securities
Commission (ASC),6 ° is to be the sole administering authori-
ty of corporate and securities law throughout Australia. 6'
"State and Territorial corporate affairs authorities are to have
no further authority in areas of regulation confided to the
[Commission]. " 62 The ASC is to be comprised of "no less than
three nor more than eight members" appointed by the Gover-
nor-General." In addition, "[t]he [Commission is] required to
establish a regional office in each State and Territory and to
establish such other offices as it thinks fit."" The offices, un-
der the charge of a Regional Commissioner, are responsible for
158. Corporations Act 1989, ch. 1 (Austl.).
159. Prior to the adoption of the Act, the Commonwealth faced a constitutional
challenge from New South Wales, South Australia and Western Australia which
were uneasy about losing the significant revenue generated by corporate registra-
tion fees. The challenge alleged that § 51(xx) does not grant Parliament the power
to regulate incorporation of companies. The High Court agreed with the States,
declaring that "the words 'formed within the limits of the Commonwealth,' exclude
the process of incorporation itself." N.S.W. v. Commonwealth, (1990) 90 A.L.R. 355,
355. Subsequently, an agreement between Parliament and the States was reached
whereby the States agreed to relinquish control over powers of incorporation in
return for a share of the revenues generated by registration fees. See HANKS,
supra note 135. Thus, the amended version of the Corporations Act includes a
provision whereby "each State and the Northern Territory was to enact legislation
requiring courts and others to treat the applied as if it were a law of the Com-
monwealth." BAXT, supra note 95, at 5.
160. The Commission was created by the enactment of the Australian Securi-
ties Commission Act 1989. See Australian Securities Commission Act 1989 § 7
(Austl.) [hereinafter ASCA].
161. Id. § 5.
162. BAXT, supra note 95, at 5. The Ministerial Council was to continue under
the new law, but with greatly diminished responsibility. For instance, it had no
control over the ASC as it had with the old NCSC and its power over the legisla-
tive process was greatly diminished under the new arrangements. Id.
163. ASCA, supra note 160, §§ 8, 9(1)-(2). The Commission is presently com-
prised of the Chairman (Alan Cameron), the Deputy Chairman (Lynn Ralph), and
the Statutory Member (Bill Robinson). See CORPORATE RELATIONS UNIT, AUSTRA-
LIAN SECURITIES COMIISSION, OBJECTIVES AND ORGANISATION OF THE AUSTRALIAN
SECURITIES COMMISSION (July 1995) [hereinafter ASC CORPORATE RELATIONS UNIT].
164. BAXT, supra note 95, at 7. Section 95 of the ASCA states that "in deciding
on the number and location of its offices, the Commission shall seek to ensure
that it serves adequately the needs of business communities throughout Australia."
ASCA, supra note 160, § 95.
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the "principal regulatory and investigative functions of the
Commission."'6 5 Section 3(2) of the Australian Securities
Commission Act (ASCA) sets forth the goals of the Commis-
sion:
In performing its functions and exercising its powers, the
Commission shall strive:
(a) to maintain, facilitate, and improve the perfomance...
of the securities markets...
(b) to maintain the confidence of investors in the securities
markets ... by ensuring adequate protection for such inves-
tors;
(c) to achieve uniformity throughout Australia in how the
Commission and its delegates perform those functions and
exercise those powers ...
(g) to take whatever action it can take, and is necessary in
order to enforce and give effect to national scheme laws."
By virtue of Section 3(g), quoted above, the Commission is
given virtually unlimited powers when performing its duties.
This "necessary and proper clause""7 is reiterated in Section
11(4) which states that "[tlhe Commission has the power to do
whatever is necessary for or in connection with, or reasonably
incidental to, the performance of its functions."6 ' Included in
these powers is the right to institute proceedings against al-
leged violators of the law,"9 and the right to levy fines and
165. BAXr, supra note 95, at 7. Examples of the Regional Offices' duties are:
scrutiny of prospectuses, takeover documents, and company accounts; investigations
into contraventions of the law; regulation of the securities markets; licensing and
monitoring of securities dealers, advisors and futures brokers; and registration of
auditors and liquidators. See ASC CORPORATE RELATIONS UNIT, supra note 163.
166. ASCA, supra note 160, § 3(2).
167. Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution grants Congress the* right "[to
make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution
the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the
Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof." U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8.
168. ASCA, supra note 160, § 11(4).
169. Section 49 declares:
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imprisonment for violations of provisions of the ASCA.7 °
The 1989 Act does not suffer from the multitude of weak-
nesses which hampered the cooperative scheme, and, as a
result, it has not suffered the same fate.1 ' While the coopera-
tive scheme was said to have offended "fundamental democrat-
ic principles because it was a fragmented regime in which no
Parliament, no Government, and no Minister had responsibili-
ty for the scheme," the same can not be said about the new
system in which every aspect is controlled by the federal gov-
ernment or one of its agencies. Funded entirely by the Com-
monwealth," the ASC, unlike the NCSC,7 4 is accountable
only to the Commonwealth Attorney-General, who is given
significant power to direct the ASC to pursue certain policies
and investigate certain cases. 75 Thus, administration of Aus-
tralian corporate and securities law rests solely in the hands of
the Commonwealth.
Enforcement of the law under the new regime is adminis-
tered completely by the Commonwealth. Although not techni-
cally federal law, the agreement reached by the Common-
wealth and the States prior to the enactment of the 1989
Act 76 effectively made the legislation equivalent to that of
Commonwealth legislation. Therefore, "offenses against any
applied law [are] treated as Commonwealth offenses coming
under the purview of the Australian Federal Police and the
Where as a result of an investigation or from a record or an examination
it appears to the Commission that a person may have committed an
offense against a national scheme law or a relevant previous law of this
jurisdiction, and ought to be prosecuted for the offense, the Commission
may cause a prosecution of the person for the offense to be begun and
carried out.
Id. § 49.
170. For example, Section 64 provides for a fine and/or imprisonment to be
levied upon a person who at a hearing gives "information or makes a statement
that is false or misleading." Id. § 64.
171. At the time of this writing, the Corporations Act, 1989 still provides the
foundation for the corporate and securities legislation of Australia and the ASC is
still the sole administering body.
172. BAXT, supra note 95, at 4.
173. In 1993/1994, the Commonwealth earmarked 136.1 million Australian dol-
lars to the ASC. See ASC CORPORATE RELATIONS UNIT, supra note 163.
174. The NCSC was accountable to the Ministerial Council, made up of the
attorneys-general of each of the States, the Northern Territory and the Federal
Government. See Ryan, supra note 154.
175. See BAXT, supra note 95, at 6.
176. See HAs, supra note 135.
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Commonwealth Director of Public Offenses." 7 ' Thus, with
investigations being run by the ASC and prosecutions being
conducted by the federal prosecutor, enforcement of the law
has finally been removed from the jurisdiction of the States
and the Northern Territory (which had in the past either inad-
equately performed their duties or refused to perform them
altogether),"8 and placed squarely within the realm of the
Commonwealth. This change brought legitimacy back to the
Australian markets and confidence back to the investing pub-
lic.
The legislative process was also amended under the new
law to give the Commonwealth virtually complete control.
Whereas under the cooperative scheme the States and the
Northern Territory had firm control over the enactment of new
legislation, 79 under the new scheme, their powers are greatly
diminished. "Legislative reform on national markets
(takeovers, securities, public fundraising, and futures) [is] be
the sole responsibility of the Commonwealth [and while] other
proposals are to be considered and approved by the [Ministeri-
all Council, the Commonwealth is not obliged to introduce any
proposal of which it does not approve."80  After years of
experimenting with different corporate and securities legisla-
tive schemes, Australia finally succeeded in enacting a viable
system of regulation. Nearly fifty years prior to the enactment
of the 1989 Act, Australians realized that local regulation of a
national industry was an impossibility. Through cooperation,
the federal government hoped to put the problems associated
with regulating the corporate and securities fields behind
them, but unfortunately, troubles persisted. While taking com-
plete control away from the local governments was a drastic
measure, Australia realized this was the only way to finally
put an end to the problems the industries faced. The 1989 Act
transferred complete control of the corporate and securities
fields to the Commonwealth and succeeded in eliminating the
problems that had plagued prior systems, such as a lack of
uniformity and an inability to enforce the law. Thus, through
the implementation of federal legislation, Australia was finally
177. Id. at 5.
178. See id. at 4.
179. See Redmond, supra note 130.
180. BAXT, supra note 95, at 5.
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able to put an end to the nightmare that haunted the corporate
and securities systems throughout the years.
IV. CONCLUSION
Successful regulation of the Canadian securities markets
demands intervention by the federal government. "The evi-
dence has repeatedly established that the securities market is
a national market."'' Over the years, the provinces have
come to realize this fact and have attempted to cooperate with
one another in an effort to make legislation uniform through-
out the country. Even uniformity is not enough, though. "Issu-
ers and investors demand liquid, transparent, well informed
markets with low transaction (including regulatory) costs and
high integrity. If [a] market [does] not satisfy these require-
ments, transactions can easily flow elsewhere."82 While coop-
eration and uniformity would help solve many of the problems
facing the Canadian system, it can not help overcome the limi-
tations imposed by the Canadian Constitution. Because at
present, the provinces are unable to legislate or enforce the
law beyond their territorial boundaries, absent a federal Con-
stitutional amendment, the provinces will never be able to
effectively regulate the securities markets in Canada. Although
"successive generations of Canadian courts and members of the
Privy Council have fostered the vision of a strong cooperative
federalism in which.., duplication of powers by the two levels
of government were regarded as wholesome, and.., a reason-
able price [to pay] for the greater evil of excessive central-
ism,"" this philosophy will have to give way if the Canadian
markets are to survive. Federal participation is needed to re-
store the integrity of the markets and the confidence of inves-
tors. The tale of Bre-X Minerals Ltd. merely provided the lat-
est illustration of this now long overdue reality.
The development of the present securities system in Aus-
tralia provides a brilliant example of the benefits which can
result from federal participation in the securities industry.
Suffering from nearly the identical problems which face the
Canadian securities industry, the Commonwealth of Australia
181. Redmond, supra note 132, at 94.
182. Waitzer & Sahazizian, supra note 102, at 102.
183. Ziegel, supra note 103, at 2-3.
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stepped forward and assumed responsibility for an industry in
disarray. Realizing that cooperation was not the answer, the
Commonwealth Parliament created a system which took con-
trol completely away from the States and the Northern Territo-
ry, which like the Canadian provinces, were ineffectively ad-
ministering and enforcing the law. Through the enactment of
federal uniform legislation and the creation of a federal body to
administer securities law and investigate alleged violations
throughout the country, enforcement became a reality and
efficiency returned to the markets. A streamlined legislative
process able to quickly respond to changes in information and
technology provided uniformity throughout the country, elimi-
nating the difficulties and confusion that resulted from the
substantive differences in State legislation. In short, by assum-
ing control of the corporate and securities industry, the Aus-
tralian Commonwealth brought order to chaos.
Canada's securities industry remains in a state of chaos.
The federal government must follow the example of the Aus-
tralian Parliament and assume legislative control of the corpo-
rate and securities industry.' Whether the form the legisla-
tion takes mirrors that of Australia is not important. What is
important is that future law concerning Canada's securities
system transfers complete control away from the provinces and
grants full control to the federal government. Only then will
Canada's tarnished reputation be restored to a respectable
level, and only then will the problems the Canadian securities
industry faces finally be resolved.
Jeffrey A. Lehman
184. "In June 1996, 8 of the 10 provinces endorsed the idea of a federally
operated Canadian Securities Commission which would exercise regulatory respon-
sibilities to be transferred by the provinces." Stikeman, Elliot, supra note 128, at
32.
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